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The an a ly sis is g u id ed by co n sid erin g P. K. M oser's (1988) in te rp re tation of p a ra g ra p h 253 fro m -O n C ertain ly -. The re su lt is th a t his critiq u e of' doxastic th e o ries in Pollock's classificatio n (1986) o f th e c o n te m p o ra ry epistem ological th e o ries fo r u n ex h a u stiv ity is n o t a d e q u a te , b ec au se th e sa m e lack Is show n by u n d o x astic theories.
T h ro u g h th e ep istem ic te rm s like do u b t, g r o n d / reaso n , fo u n d a tio n / b asis a n d th o se a lre a d y m entioned, it follow s th a t W ittg en stein 's ep iste m o logical fra m e h e a d s to d ire c t realism , c h a lle n g in g the co n fu sio n in Pol lock's classification, disco v erin g th e c u r r e n t of W ittg en stein 's h in ts a t th e sa m e tim e. ' The follow ing fram ew ork is offered in posing the problem of »On Certainty«: m u ch of o u r know ledge a re beliefs adopted by learn in g from text-books or fro m the teacher. In such m a n n e r we le a rn various language-gam es an d science.
So we develop o u r system of know ledge in which we believe a n d according to which we act. In the sam e way we form o u r sys tem s of doubts, and the original language-gam e develops by a b an d o n in g m any of o u r beliefs; the know ledge begins to grow ' T he p re se n t a rtic le is b ased o n th e a u th o r's le ctu res in th e In stitu tes of philosophy in G ra z an d S alzb u rg , held in J a n u a ry 1989. The a u th o r is Indebted fo r o rg an isa tio n , s u p p o rt a n d co m m en ts to Prof. W e in g a rtn e r a n d P ro f Z echa (Salzburg), to p ro fe sso rs H aller, E lisabeth List. G om bocz (Graz) a n d to o th er m e m b e rs o f both sta ffs a n d to th e stu d e n ts too. M ost of the n o te s a r e the resu lt o f d iscussion an d of ad d itio n a l literatu re , su ch as som e fin al d efin itio n s an d the conclusion, in the later stage. The religious beliefs a re the firm est, because any reason against them does not cause doubt. We a re tau g h t the em pirical ground (Begründung), but the things in which we definitely believe a re learned by us by OUT own é3Ejp6Ìlen< ■ ■ and o u r own action.
Som e know ledge is b elief

D ifference betw een b e lie f an d k n o w
G. Ryle (1949) in -The C oncept od Mind« does not by tu rn s the term s »belief« and »know« em phasizing th a t 'b elief suggests trust w ithout the possibility of proving som ething and 'know' m eans that we a re not possibly wrong, because we have relevant evidence. K lausner and Kuntz consider it im possible eith er in science, or in belief (in religious belief of course) to do w ithout the basic, i.e. ungro u n d ed beliefs (1961:31). W ittgenstein's view is d ifferent a n d m ore m odern.
Some beliefs are considered by W ittgenstein as knowing, bu t he tried to m ark the difference betw een them . In som e cases, he thought, it is better to say »1 don't believe it, I know it« (424). It is not correct to say »I know th a t the law of induction is true«, it is m ore c orrect to say »I believe in the law of...« (500). The possibil ity of knowledge about physical objects, fo r ins. »cannot be proved by the protestations of those who believe that they have such knowledge« (488).
The difference which he em phasized saying »1 know o r only I believe« is obvious on the first glance. He rep eated several tim es th at sam e idea (364, 366-8, 380-1, 485-6, 402, 520-I). Such a difference is very clear if we say »I know...« o r only »I be lieve...«, because the second way is w rong (425). W e c an n o t say »I believe in physics«, but »I know th a t physics is true«, an d not -He knows it, but it isn't so«. It is supposed »I know« expresses the re lation between me a n d the fact, »I believe« betw een me an d the sense of the proposition (90). F u rth er difference he explains in relation to know as the ability to answ er the question »How does he know«, and in relation to belief as an incapability to answ er the question »why he believes it.« (550). In term s of languagegam es if som ebody says th at he knows som ething, he m ust be, by g eneral consent, in a position to know (555), and we n ev er say that som ebody is in a position to believe som ething (556). 'Knowl edge' and 'certainty' belong to d ifferen t categories, the second being typical fo r believing (161,239-242, 340, 386, 526). The know l edge expresses certainty (582) which is d ifferen t from the cer tainty of believing, because the first includes the o th e r person who in u n d e rstan d in g is not differen t from me (563). C onse quently, the difference betw een knowing an d believing is not in me (489-490). It very c le a r difference is found the following: fo r to know we look for ground-reasons, a belief has no justification -in the first case it is possible to prove the truth (243), in the sec ond the reasons can n o t be m ore certain th an the statem en t itself (243), hence a belief has not a justification (175)."
B e lie f o r/a n d k n o w
If one learn s in a certain way, then he says th at he knows and we believe in all w hat we know (177, 218). We believe th a t we know, because we have confidence in text-books (600) and in all we were ta u g h t (289-291). I am convinced th at the o thers believe 2 W e ca n r e a d as follow ing definitions: -(know p b u t -p) (602), believe p b u t -p (42). T hey d e m o n stra te so m e th in g an a lo g o u s to Plato's d istin ctio n b etw een know ledge a n d b elief as it is ex p lain e d in b ay th e an a ly tic a l v o c a b u la ry J. H intik ka:
a know s th a t p -» p (it is v alid im plication) a believes th a t p -> p (it is o fte n false) (1974:11). It seem s, th a t W ittg e n stein sp e a k s a b o u t th e stro n g co n cep t o f know ledge, w hich c a n be d efen sab le, a c c o rd in g to th e w ord of W e in g a rtn e r, by J. H intikka, R. C hisholm a n d W e in g a rtn e r h im self ex p lain in g a s follow ing: »the p e rso n a know s th a t p« m e a n s -know ing p em p ties th a t p is tru e -(1981:146).
O th e r p a r a g ra p h s in th is text show th a t W ittg e n stein used, so to speak, a n exclusive con cep t of ra tio n a l belief, w hich W e in g a rtn e r explains:
»If som eon e believes so m e th in g he does n o t (yet) know it; a n d if he know s (already) h e does n o t (need a n y m o re to) believe it« (1981:144, 1982:243) .
In fa v o u r of a) we fin d th e g ro u p of p a ra g ra p h s : 364, 366-8, 380-1, 485-6, 520-1, w h ere his »I know o r only I believe« we ca n co n sid er a s re v e rse of: believe p -> -know p. T he d irec t fo rm o f prev io u s d efin itio n is par. 500, a n d a lm o st d irectly illu s tra te d a) by W ittg en stein IS his tre a tm e n t of religious belief, w hich is th e th em e of th e a u th o r's a rtic le fo rth c o m in g in F ilozofska istraživanja. Z agreb.
Prof. W e in g a rtn e rs a ssiste n t in fa v o u r of b) su g g ests to r e a d W ittg en stein 's p a r. 424, h ere m entioned, But, we c a n d efin e W ittg e n stein 's »I d o n 't believe it, I know it« as :
-believe p, know , p, w hich is a so m ew h at re v e rse fo rm of th e su g g e sted read in g : know p -believe p. T he d irec t fo rm we fin d in p a r. 90, they know th at all is so (288). The sentence »I know...« expresses »the readiness to believe certain things« (330), and we know with the sam e certainty with which we believe a lot of assu m ed things (340). We believe and know (218) a nest of propositions (225), be cause from our learning arises all our system of know ledge (286).3
B elief as k n o w
We believe on the ground of learn in g (171) in a n e n tire body of o u r knowledge which was h an d ed to us (288). C onsequently, we believe in geographical, chem ical an d historical facts (169-170), in one word, we believe in proposition of n a tu ra l science (167) which is a source of all o u r beliefs 209 ). Be sides, we believe in other things which we have learned -co n cerning o u r body (250-4, 325-7), o u r practical use of th in g s in connection with which we have learned countless languagegam es (374, 376-7, 476-80). But, w hen we begin to believe in som ething, it is not individual propositions, b u t all the system of propositions (141) which gradually form s a n en tire system of be lief (144). One believes in som e things with such a convinction th at it becomes a system, a stru c tu re (102); with u n sh ak eab le convinction »it is anch ored in all« questions an d answ ers (103) th a t it is the d ep artu re fo r every of o u r argum entations, test, co n firm a tion an d falsification of hipothesis (105). Hence, belief as knowl edge is actually a learned know ledge in which we believe.
3 H ere we see two kinds o f definitions: know p -t believe p (177, 218, 330, 340) believe p -> know p (600, 289-291), a n d »we believe a n d know« (218), w hich ind icates th a t th e seco n d (weak) claim is co n tain e d in th e first, i.e.:
know p believe p . believe p -» know p, hence: know (believe) p -> believ ejk n o w ) p. As a n illu stratio n th e re follow s the text in 4.1., esp ecially a n e n tire lin e of p a ra g ra p h s in 4.1., an d th e text in 4.2. So w e c a n conclud e (an d p rof. W e in g a rtn e r suggests this), th a t h e re is p rese n t -the m ain theorem « as a co n d itio n f o r ra tio n a l belief, which Prof. W e in g a rtn e r ex p lain s as: » ... if som eo n e know s so m e th in g h e also believes it« ( 
Certainty, doubts, m ista kes
B e lie f -doubts a n d certainty
W e have no room fo r doubts in things which stan d firm ly (234, 247) an d looking a t this and this and liestening to th a t and th a t one is not in a position to doubt (280). We do not doubt in cal culation (337), in statem e n ts in norm al circu m stan ces (333-4) and we a re not tau g h t to doubt w hen we see la te r th e sam e ob ject (472), i.e. we do not dou b t if we have the system inside which som e of these doubts c an n o t exist (247). This is »the rock bottom« of o u r convinction (248), on it we act with certainty which does not know for doubt, hence we do not accept an y o n e's experience o r proof which is ag ain st o u r belief (360). In »I believe it. w ith cer tainty« in the w ord c e rta in ' we wish to em phasize o u r »complete convinction, the total ab sen ce of doubt, an d thereby we seek to convince o th er people« (194) . But, if we act with certainty which offers belief, then it is not surprising, says W ittgenstein, »that Lhere is m uch we can n o t doubt« (331). C onsequently, in the first line W ittgenstein considers certainty of belief as subjective cer tainty.
K ant's notion of the subjectively sufficient an d the objective ly insufficient belief (after K lausner, Kuntz, 12-13) is considered by W ittgenstein as subjective certainty. The term 'certain ty 'is conected by K ant with objective sufficincy. i.e. with knowledge. W ittgenstein w rote enough about subjective certainty. Il' 1 act with com plet certainty, thinks W ittgenstein, th en it is my own certainty (174). »I believe...« in such a case expresses subjective tru th (179). To be perfectly certain expresses p erso n al attitu d e (404), hence it is not senseless that, others doubt w hat 1 »declare to be certain« (629). W ittgenstein is not in terested in »to be certain« (308), because it concerns subjective certainty w hich h e criticises in m any places (30,194,245,415,563).
K now -certainty, doubts a n d m ista kes
Instead of »I know« som etim es we can say »I am su re it is so« (176), o r »There is no such things as a doubt in this case« (58), o r »I c an 't be m aking a m istake« (633).
Since as a concept know ledge is coupled with th a t of the la n guage-gam e (560) certainty is not som ething to which we can m ore o r less aproxim ate, but »this language-gam e just is like that« (56). The definition of the language-gam e resides in c ertain ty (497), because certainty is its n a tu re (457). M any p a ra g ra p h s are concerned w ith the so called objective certainty, b ecau se ac tually it is o u r issue h ere a n d which we shall com ent later, in connection with 4.1. He says th a t we are certain in n o rm a l cir cum stances (250, 423, 441, 622), in the context of th e situation (347-50, 406, 423), not. outside the context (532-3, 535, 554), since in language-gam es we a re in the position to know (396). W e a re as certain in everyday propositions as we are in em p irical facts (306), fo r ins. this is m y h a n d (441, 446), an d we a re c ertain in som e em pirical an d in m athem atical propositions (447-8, 654-667).
W hat defines a language-gam e is th a t one keeps his c ertain ty although som ebody tries to arouse various kinds of doubts (497). Doubt presupposes the certainty, says W ittgenstein in 12 places (115, 160, 283, 310, 316, 329, 341, 368, 450, 472, 519). It is not doubting behavior if it is not non-doubting too (354). The possibil ity of the language-gam e does not depend »on ev ery th in g being doubted th a t can be doubted« (392). Some doubts a re no t in o u r gam e (316). For o u r language-gam es it is essential th at a t certain points no doubts a p p e a r (523-4); it gradually loses its sense (56), because doubt w ithout its end is not doubt a t all (626). The a b sence of doubt belongs to the essence of the lan g u ag e-g am e (370) an d this does not falsify the language-gam e (375). O ne n ev er le arn the language-gam e if he calls in doubt those th in g s in which we have no doubts (394, 329). He said he could give co u n t less exam ples (371), the exam ples with han d s (19, 306, 371, 456), with legs (409) and others (328, 337, 345-6, 490; 613; 510; 519). We use them all as em pirical facts which are beyond d oubts (519). We use them all as em pirical facts which a re beyond doubts (519). And he adds th a t we can not doubt in som e em p irical p ro p ositions »if m aking judgem ents is to be possible« a n d action too (308, 232), hence som e em pirical judgem ent m u st b e beyond doubts (519). W e cannot doubt in som e geographical d ates w hich are connected w ith existence (20, 316-17). M athem atical proposi tions are exem pt of doubt, as m any non-m ath em atical proposi tions are (653). An experim ent is not possible a t all, if th e re a re not »some things th a t one does not doubt« (337); in gen eral, the logic of our scientific investigation im plies »that certain things are indeed not doubted« (342). Besides, doubt is not reaso n ab le in certain objects (this is a tree 394, 452-4), etc. (522). In certain situ ations it is not reasonable to doubt, either (he w asn't in the s tra tosphere 218-222, never onthe m oon 338, o r if som eone says: »I go through door«, 391). In all these cases th ere a re no groundreasons for doubt, because the question w h eth er one needs the grounds for doubt (122) is answ ered, w henever one looks, h e does not see the ground fo r doubt that... (123). The g ro u n d s fo r doubt sim ply do not m ake any sense in such an d sim ilar cases (4, 306: th a t is a n arm , 387, th e re is a tree).
Actually, the question is »how is doubt in tro d u ced in in la n guage-gam e?« (458). G enerally, the statem en t »I know ...« is su b ject to doubt (121, 178). W ittgenstein says: »(My)
In such a way one n eed s to show objectively (hat »I am not m aking a m istake about that« (16, 15). There is a d ifferen ce be tween a m istake for which the position is p rep ared in th e g am e an d a com plete irreg u la rity w hich occurs as exception (647). In the first case, if 1 m ake a m istake which shows to my statem en t its position in the gam e, »that doesn't d etract from the u sefu l ness of the language-gam e« (637). T herefore on does not know the truth about som e point w ith perfect certainty with a m istake being excluded (404-5). As a m istake h a s a cause an d a ground if som ebody m akes a m istake, »this can be fitted into w hat he know s aright« (74). However, som e types of cases exists w here, says W ittgenstein, »I can rightly say th at the m istake I c a n 't m ake. 1 can list d ifferen t types« (675 -6), »but not, give an y com m on characeristics« (674). N evertheless, he tried to give them in c ertain sense, i.e. to list som e characteristics. The statem ent: »I can 't be m aking a mistake« is used in practice as the principle of h u m an research (670-1), as em phasis of the value of certain ty of statem en t (638), or as a m e an s for persu asio n (669), also a s ad d i tion of som ething p a rtic u la r to the generally accepted (664-5). O ne m istake is not expected in the fu tu re if o u r know ing is based on the behaviour of som ething in certain circu m stan ces in the p a st (559, 624-5), or in various cases which stan d fa st (425, 567 -9, 570, 574, 577, 628, 642), it is difficult to m ake a m istake a b o u t one's own nam e (528), the m ajority of people do not. m ake m istake about their nam es (628).
G rounds
G rounds fo r b e lie f
Subjective certainty excludes the possibility of giving the grounds, i.e. it does not give justification. Hence, W ittgenstein rightly puts the question: »Why is it supposed to be possible to bave grounds fo r believing' som ething if it isn't possible to be certain?« (373). The answ er we find in his co nsideration of the gro u n ds fo r believing. He states th at from the b eg in n in g of learning, as we have already seen, we not do do u b t in a lot of things, although we have no right, good g ro u n d s fo r believing them (91,283). As a m a tte r of fact we have no g ro u n d s fo r non b e lieving. If a pupil refuted to believe in some inform ation (this m ountain had been there beyond h u m an memory), we would say th at he »had no g ro u n d s fo r this suspicion« (322). We have no reason not to believe in teaching of the existence of som ething (of earth: 182, o r of N apoleon: 186), we have no g ro u n d s not to tru st text-books fo r experim ental physics (600), etc. (516). But if we believe on grounds of w hat we learn (171), asks W ittgenstein, is then a belief grounded? (173). He searched fo r th e an sw er by m eans of a n o th er question -is it w rong th a t a proposition of physics is guiding o u r actions, m ust we say th a t we have no good g ro u n d for doing so, is not »this w hat we call a 'good g ro u n d '?« (608). Hence, som e of o u r beliefs have groun d s too an d m ore ex plicit -it is difficult »to realize the g ro undlessn ess of o u r believ ing« (166). It is obvious th a t some of o u r beliefs have grounds, which is illustrated by Lhe cases described, as we have seen, and fo r som e of them we can n o t find justification (175), a n d to them it is difficult to rem ove the grounds, i.e. to which it is needed to re move the grounds, as for religious beliefs fo r w hose g ro u n d s it is ap p aren t, because they a re not o u r gam e (609, 612), since such believers do not believe the grounds of critics (336). H ere would Follow the objection on par. 253, but we shall com e to this in 4.2.
G rounds fo r know ledge
It is not easy to give the grounds fo r o ur know ledge. If we a re certain an d have not any doubt about som ething, still we can n o t give grounds fo r our way to go on, o r th ere are thousends, but none so certain as it is supposed fo r the g ro u n d to be (307). It seem s th at »I know« prescind from all g ro u n d s (574). It does not reavel the ground for o u r decision fo r o r ag ain st our proposition (200), because the g round is n e ith e r true n o r false (205) . W e can say th a t som ething is true, b u t on the demand, fo r grounds, we m ight say »I c a n 't give« any gro u n d s (206) . N eith er is the experience the g ro u n d fo r o u r gam e of judging (131). But, »it m ust be possible to test w h eth er I know it« (574). Besides w hen we say »I know« it m ight tu rn d out to be w rong (580).
Surely »I know« expresses the read en ess to give com pelling (243) a n d convincing g rounds (563) fo r such knowing. But it is w rong from the point of view of th e language-gam e th a t it is pos sible a t the end to »adduce such gro u n d s as we hold to be grounds« (599). In p a rtic u la r circum stances it is possible to give the g ro u n d s fo r the statem en t one know s (111), b u t it is im p o rtan t th a t giving the grounds m ust satisfy th e o th er th a t is in the posi tion to know (438-441). The others will accept o u r statem en t »I know«, w hich often m ean s th a t one h a s his own g ro u n d fo r it, if they a re acq u ain ted w ith the language-gam e (18). Som etim es w ith »I know« we a ssu re som ebody in the certitude of o ur grounds, w hen one does not alre ad y know which »would have com pelled the conclusion th a t I knew« (431), i.e. if everybody takes fo r g a ra n te d th a t th a t it is know n (439). So, it is not »telling g rounds fo r something« w hat »I decide« (271). In general, it follows th a t in a n a p p ro p ria te language-gam e we can give to it a p p ro p ria te g round s w hich will justify o u r knowing.
B elief/kn o w led g e (b/k)
W e sep a ra te d the consideration of belief fro m th a t of know ing w ith the aim to show in a m ore detailed way th a t W ittgen stein, in som e cases, m ade a very c lea r difference, bu t very often he considered them together, especially if he th o u g h t of such know ledge w hich he held believing. Som etim es he m entioned beliefs, actually belief/know ledge, w hat is show n by the co m p ar ison betw een 1.2. an d 1.3., w here we can fin d the sam e p a ra g ra p h -288. W e find the sam e in th e com parison 1.3. w ith 2.1. w here we a re com pelled to re p e at par. .234. P articu larly suitable fo r o u r sintgm a belief/know ledge (b/k) a re the com parison inside 2. an d inside 3.
Com parison o f 2.1. an d 2.2.
C onsidering certainty an d doubt in connection w ith belief a n d know ledge it is still m ore clear th a t W ittgenstein considered the know ledge as belief. The first draw s one's atten tio n to the scarcity of d a ta in 2.1. which we can leave. Then, th ere was a problem with the exam ples too, because a lot of them a re identical in 2.1. a n d 2.2. We find enough p a ra g ra p h s in which, in fact, the certainty borders on both, i.e. on o u r b /k , as fo r ins. in connection w ith facts about the world, about m y body, ab o u t em pirical propositipns an d in science (92, 136-7, 162-3, 167, 170, 209, 245, 273-5, 286, 340, 360, 308, 582-3). The best arg u m e n t in this sense is the objective certainty which W ittgenstein opposed to subjective certainty, because the objective certain ty touches exactly b /k . W hen W ittgenstein a rg u es th a t th e know ledge is not subjective he opposed it to subjective certain ty as believing, i.e. to the belief which is not knowing. In this sense it is possible to in terp ret alread y m entioned p a ra g ra p h s in 2.1 (179, 194, 245, 415, 563). Subjective sureness does not exist fo r know ledge, he argues, because certainty is subjective, not know ledge a n d tru th (179, 245). If »I believe th a t I know« does -not need« to express lesser degree of certainty«, then here one does not sp eak ab o u t the greatest subjective certainty, b u t th a t certain propositions »un derlie all questions an d all thinking« (415), i.e. som ething is objec tively certain if it is not possible to m ake m istakes (19, 194) , an d this is possible, as we have seen in 1.1. w hen th e o th e r p erso n is not sep arated from m e by »a difference in understan d in g « (563). Such objective certitude (270) can be still b e tte r u n d ersto o d if we ad d 274 to the quoted p a ra g rap h s 272 an d 273 in 2.2, w here he ex plains th a t the objectively certain countless em pirical proposi tions give the experience which teaches us »host of in terd ep en d en t propositions«. The objective certainty shows evidence in the language-gam e which speaks fo r o u r proposition (203) a n d o u r belonging to the »community which is b o und to g eth er by science an d education« (298).
All this is characteristic also fo r doubts a n d th e exam ples a re the same. Besides, to o u r sintagm a b /k th e en tire text about language-gam e in 2.2. is directed. Hence, we can conclude: Some propositions of belief (Pb) a re not justified (J), b ecau se they a re subjectively certain. Subjective certainty is re la te d to believer, not to belief. It is not possible to justify the believer, because his propositions a re not objectively c ertain (OC). However, som e propositions a re objectively certain. The justification gives the objective certainty, b u t if som e propositions a re objectively cer tain, they a re the propositions of b /k . Hence, we can take the sc h e m e ... Some P OC a re b /k a n d they c an be J In w hich w ay they a re justified is show n especially 4.2.
C om parison betw een 3.1. a n d 3.2
M entioning the lack of grounds fo r doubt, ch aracteristic fo r both, belief a n d knowing, W ittgenstein a g ain speaks ab o u t b /k , because the analogous exam ples illu strates both. They a re ex am ples fro m everyday life, or from le arn ed things. A lthough the good a n d rig h t gro u n d s do not exist fo r beliefs, h e said, we have no the g ro u n d s fo r n o n believing. As we m ust have th e gro u n d s fo r doubts, so we m ust have the g ro u n d s fo r know ledge -the reaso n s a n d the justification we can have fo r »I know«, b u t not fo r b elief -evidently, fo r b /k we c an have. Such is W ittgenstea in 's effo rt to com bat the sceptical a rg u m e n t a g ain st b /k , i.e. w eaker concept of know ledge. 4 Evidently, M oser's com m ent on par. 253. m oves in o th er di rection. He considered such text as fo u n d atio n doxastic epistem ological theory, i.e. as acceptance of unjustified beliefs as fo u n d ation fo r the justification of all o th e r beliefs, alth o u g h h e a d m its th a t unjustified basic beliefs have »a fe a tu re th a t d istin guishes th em fro m the basic beliefs of foundationalism «, w hat Pollock's doxastic epistem ological theo ries m ake n o n exaustive (1988: 132-133) . But his thesis w as th a t »W ittgensteinian view is u n accep tab le in its account of in fe re n tia l justification« (133).
In o u r line of in te rp re ta tio n we m u st first indicate the w rong in English tra n slatio n of the quoted p a ra g ra p h . The G erm an text is: »Am G ründe des b e g rü n d eten G laubens liegt d e r u n b e g rü n dete Glaube«, a n d the English tra n slatio n in th e book, edited by A nscom be a n d von W right is: »At the fo u n d atio n of wellfo u n d ed belief lies belief th a t is not founded.« 4 W e a k e r con cep t of know ledge is in u se by »Most of sc ien tist today« (W ein g a rtn e r, 1981:146-147). So th e stro n g con cep t of k n o w led g e is su p p o rte d also by »suitable w e a k e r concepts like d iffe re n t k in d s of b elief a n d a s su m p tio n fo r ex p re ssin g w e a k e r statem en t« (147). W ittg e n stein u se d th e te rm assu m p tio n , too, see 4.2. a n d th e n o te 5.
The right tran slatio n w ould be: At the g round of g rounded belief lies u n g ro u n d e d belief. Af te r such tran slatio n it is easier to see th a t the par. 253 very well il lu strates w hat we said about religious beliefs in 3.1. T hat is to say, the religious beliefs ap p ears as very well g ro u n d ed beliefs (336), but, a fte r W ittgenstein, behind it there is the u n g ro u n d ed belief (609, 612). As the gam e which is not ours is spoken ab o u t here, W ittgenstein m entions the difficulty of rem oving such a ground, w hat is alread y said in 3.1. Hence, this p a ra g ra p h is not related to b /k which is in the centre of o u r analysis. W e m ust draw attention to the tran slatio n an d the use of th e term s 'die G ru n dlage', 'das F undam ent' an d 'fu n d a m e n ta l' too a n d keep them separately from 'd er G ru n d '«.
W ittgenstein thinks th a t o u r justifications have the end (192, 204, 213) , as h as giving the reasons (412), i.e. w ith giving the g rounds (die B egründung) (110, 204). At such a n e n d we do no t ob ta in the certain proposition w hich im m ediatelly strikes us as tru e (204). That is u n g ro u n d ed (unbegründete) presupposition, »it is a n u n g ro u n d ed way of acting« (110). W e do not o b tain an y kind of seeing the tru e proposition, b u t »our acting w hich lies a t the bottom of the language-gam e« (204). For o r a g ain st o u r proposi tion speaks o u r language-gam e (203). So we can say th a t th e a p p ro p riate language-gam e (LG) gives the g ro u n d s (G) fo r som e propositions. Giving the grounds, i.e. the end of ch ain of reaso n s is at the end of gam e w hen it crosses in act, b ecau se th e la n guage-gam e is p a rt of acting. O ur acting is u n g ro u n d ed , bacause the sam e gam e is, as W ittgenstein says, »som ething u n predictable«, it is not »grounded« (begründet), »It is no t re a so n able (or unreasonable). It is th e re -like o u r life« (599). H ere are connected also W ittgenstein's term s 'form of life'a n d som ething 'an im al'. Namely, objective certainty w hich b /k is carrie d out, a l though dissatisfied W ittgenstein called it »form of life« (FL) (358), as som ething which lies outside justified a n d unjustified, as it is som ething »animal« (A)(359). Hence, we can give th e schem a: Some P b /k a re J on G LG W ith the bottom of the language-gam e W ittgenstein fu sed the o ther term s -die G rundlage, das Fundam ent, fu n d am en tal. O ur w orld-picture is »die G rundlage« (translated as »the m atterof-course foundation«) fo r o u r re sea rc h (167); h e spoke also about die G rundlage (translated -foundation) in connection with all judging (614) a n d all o u r beliefs (246) -so it is som ething th a t »must be ta u g h t us as a foundation« (die Grundlage)(449). W hen W ittgenstein spoke about some em pirical propositions he m entioned the m ost fu n d a m e n tal things (»fundam entalsten Dingen«) ab o u t w hich we do not change th e opinion, »That is just w hat th e ir being 'fu n d a m e n ta l' is (»fundam ental« 512) a n d ab o u t them we m ake the statem ents w hich a p p e a re d fu n d a m e n ta l (»fundamental«), so if they a re false, w hat is 'tru e ' o r 'fa lse ' an y way? (514). They a re »fused into the fo u n d atio n s (»das F u n d a ment«) of o u r language-gam e« (558). All such o u r a ssu m p tio n s (»die A nnahm e«) in the e n tire system of o u r language-gam es (LGs) belong, as he said, to foundatio n s (F) (»das Fundament«), the assum ption (As) »forms th e basis (»die G rundlage«) of action, a n d th erefo re, n a tu ra lly of thought.5 (411). Schem atic b /k can be show n in re la tio n to fo u n d a tio n /b a sis (F):
Some P b /k a re fu sed w ith F LGs, they a re As R etu rn in g to the te rm g ro u n d we can connect it w ith the so fa r discussed fu n d a m e n ta l em pirical propositions -As, an d such p ropositions we call, says W ittgenstein, »em pirical ground« (Begründung) (296). So, som e em pirical propositions (EP), w hich a re fu n d a m e n ta l (FEP), we call em pirical g ro u n d propositions (EGP), i.e. som e P b /k a re em pirical fu n d am en tal-g ro u n d propositions-assum ptions (EGP-As). Schem atic the definition is:
Some EP w hich As a re called EGP-As, i.e. som e P b /k are EGP-As
If we connect the last definition w ith FL a n d A we can draw the picture:
LG G
LG G E G P -A s Ac Ac Ac Ac
FsL (A)
LGs is p a rt of action, or form of life (PI, 19, 23), They originate a n d d isa p e a r u n d e r circum stances, b u t ab o u t such circum stances the language-gam e does not sp eak an y th in g (618). H ence the definition:
LGs + Ac = FsL (A).
This w ould be o u r n a tu ra l history.8
Conclusion
Consequently, we obtain the final definition of P b /k : Some P b /k a re EGP-As because fused w ith F LGs w hose b ackground is FsL (A).
The last definition discovers clearly th a t it is suitable to con sider W ittgenstein's epistem ological fram e as d irect realism , in stead the doxastic (foundation) theory.
W e can draw the epistem ological fram ew ork w hich guided W ittgenstein, such as: we le arn b /k s, la te r som e of th em becom e stro n g knowledge, others rem ain w eak know ledge (belief) sup po rted by the em pirical assum ptions of stro n g kind; som e of them rem ain b e lie f which never becom e of eith er kind of knowl edge.
If we accept the thesis th a t W ittgenstein's epistem ological fram e leads to direct realism, an d if the fo u n d atio n doxastic th e ory is internalist and we said th a t W ittgenstein's th eo ry is not such, we face the question: is it possible to develop a direct re a l ism in fram ew ork of undoxastic externalist theory, i.e. is it possi ble to be probabilistic or reliability theory, a fte r Pollock's taxon omy.7 O r is it both, i.e. som ething else, which w ould show th a t Pollock's classification of contem porary epistem ological th e ories is not exhaustive fo r undoxastic theories either, as M oser rem ark ed fo r doxastic theories earlier.
F urther arg u m en tatio n is needed to be developed in such a direction, on the basis of W ittgenstein's o th er books too a n d ac counting also fo r o u r note 6.
' O u r pici m e which a ffirm s the p lu ral of la n g u ag e -g a m es an d fo rm s o f life evidently a g re es with R H aller's advocacy o f th e ir p lu ra l against, to th e s in g u la r of N. G arv er (cfr. R. H aller, 1988:129. 114-128). M ore th a n th is it is im p o rta n t to ta k e into account, the te rm 'fo rm of c u ltu re ' w hich W ittg en stein m en tio n ed a l rea d y in BRB (p.143) a n d REM (1.152). Such a possibility m ust p u t in d ifficu lties W ittg en stein 's te rm 'anim al', h e re m entioned, a n d o ffe r to h is o th e r te rm -'n a tu ra l histo ry ' a n o th e r in te rp re tatio n , also im p o rta n t fo r th e f u r th e r devel o p m en t of his epistem ology.
7 See M o s e r , op.cit. p. 131.
